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CRIME AND INSANITY:
THE LEGAL AS OPPOSED TO THE MEDICAL
VIEW, AND THE MOST COMMONLY
ASSERTED PLEAS'
JoHxN F. W. MEAGHER'
As most physicians rarely go into the legal aspects of the question
of crime and insanity, I thought I would briefly present the following
data, which I gathered recently while acting as chief alienist for the
court in a celebrated case of homicide. I will not dwell long on the
medical factors, as I have presented these elsewhere.
The law has held that "mental disease" is an indeterminate and
vague term-including conditions varying from mild indisposition to
delirious, confusional states. Medicine and law approach this question
in different ways. For example, law considers that Guiteau and Czol-
gosz were justly and properly tried and executed, no, matter what
medical critics might say to the contrary. It is said that Locke's
"Essay on Human Understanding" has had a great influence on the
legal attitude.
As the law is primarily interested in the question of responsibility
and not in insanity per se, I will have little to say of particular mental
disease entities themselves. The form of insanity -is a question of
mental pathology and is not of particular interest to law; nor are the
causes of insanity, the latter being in themselves irrelevant to the ques-
tion of responsibility. Law is concerned in the consequences (conduct)
resulting from insanity.
So the ultimate object of a legal investigation is to determine the
question of responsibility or liability to punishment, especially as it
relates to the time the individual committed the criminal act. In law,
legal insanity is commensurate with legal irresponsibility. Thus we
can see that there is a distinct boundary between the attitudes of law
and medicine. (Regina v. Leigh, 4 F. and F. 915.) Medicine con-
siders any and every abnormality; law, only the capacity of the mind
to reason.
An inquiry as to insanity is a privilege of law, and not because of
any absolute right of the person. (Wharton and Still6, Vol. I, p. 209.)
'Read before the Brooklyn Pathological Society, November 9, 1922.
2Neurologist, St. Mary's Hospital; Consulting Neurologist, Kings Park
State Hospital and Rockaway Beach Hospital, etc., Brooklyn, N. Y.
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A commission may be appointed to determine whether the accused is
ab!e to make a rational defense by intelligently conferring with counsel,
to decide whether insanity existed at the time of the act or not. (Peo-
ple v. McElvaine, 125 N. Y. 596.)
Sanity is presumed where no evidence to the contrary is furnished
by those defending the accused. The legal piesumption of insanity is
the assumption that the accused had not the mental capacity to form a
criminal purpose, and to deliberate and premeditate on an act, which
malice, anger, hatred, revenge, or evil disposition might impel, or to
know the nature and wrongfulness of the act. It also assumes an
absence of insane delusion. Needlesg to say, insanity cannot be in-
ferred intrinsically, from the nature of the act itself, but it must be
proven extrinsically.
The law does not say that no degree of madness exempts; nor
does it say that any degree of madness exempts. (Mackin v. State,
59 N. J. Law. 495.) Rather it takes a position between the two. Thus
legal irresponsibility is limited; so that not every kind and degree of
mental abnormality-permanent or temporary-renders the person
irresponsible. (Am. and Eng. Encyl. of Law, Vol. 4, p. 693.) The
Court of Appeals of New York has held that incipient insanity does
not excuse under the New York Penal Code if the accused knew the
legal quality of his act and that it was wrong. This includes paranoia.
(People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 52 N. Y. St. R. 919.) To excuse,
the insanity must be the efficient cause of the criminal act. The mere
fact of insanity does not in itself relieve from criminal responsibility.
(Bergo v. State, 26 Neb. 639.)
As Judge Cox said (in the case of Guiteau, the murderer of Presi-
dent Garfield), the greatest difficulty lies in those borderland cases.
where it is often difficult to say whether the person has passed the line
of moral or legal accountability for his actions. (Guiteau case, 10
Fed. 161.) Even those in charge of the insane know that they are
subject to discipline. And in criminal cases, the interests of society
require that the penal law assert its control. (Wharton, Crim. Law,
10th Ed., par 1, et seq.)
It is regarded that as good and evil principles both reside in man,
in choosing he must be guided by his good principles and withstand the
evil ones. The tendency to evil is checked by the restraining power
of the ego. Otherwise his conscience punishes him. These truths are
the foundation of the doctrine of criminal responsibility. Society lays
down certain external punishments for acts opposed to morality. Law
recognizes in man a freedom of will if he has understanding. Thus
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understanding is the fundamental test of responsibility. Insanity, in
law, is chiefly shown by anomalous conduct.
The right is when you act according to law; the wrong is when
you break the law. So distinguishing right from wrong means having
the knowledge that a wrong act is punishable by law. Or again, re-
sponsibility means being rightly liable to punishment. So the faculty
of knowing and judging (to a less degree, willing) is the important
legal test of irresponsibility.
LEGAL PROOF OF INSANITY
In criminal cases, the burden of proof lies on the defense. How-
ever, it has also been held that the prosecution must prove the capacity
to commit the act. (Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 159; O'Connell v.
People, 87 N. Y. 377.) In these cases, the rules against speculative
testimony are somewhat relaxed. (People v. Wood, 126 N. Y. 249.)
It might be stated here that state courts are not bound by the views of
the Supreme Court of the United States on the question of the measure
of proof of insanity. (People v. Alexander, 117 Cal. 81, 48 Pac.
1014.)
The accused can take the stand in his own behalf, but cannot give
opinion evidence, e. g., that he was insane at the time of the act. He
can only state objective facts to the court. And the defendant's own
testimony that he did not know that his act was wrong or criminal is
not sufficient to establish insanity. (Perry v. State, 87 Ala. 30.) Or
to say that his mind became a blank prior to the killing, when he re-
calls the facts of the act, does not show that he was not capable of
forming an intent to murder. (People v. Osinond, 138 N. Y. 80, 33
N. E. 739.) The statement of the accused that he knows nothing of
the crime cannot always be accepted as true.
Minute recollection of the details of the crime long after its occur-
rence is strong evidence of sanity at the time of the act. (Pienovis
case, 3 N. Y. City Hall Rec. 123.)
It has been held that the. acts and conduct of the accused are
better criteria to go by than any medical theory, or the opinion of wit-
nesses. (State v. Thomas, Houst. Crim. Rep., Del. 511.) Tests
applied must include the exact time of the commission of the offense.
Concealment of the act and an endeavor to escape tend to show a
knowledge of the nature of the offense, and the ability to discriminate
between right and wrong. (U. S. v. Shults, 6 McLean 121, Fed. Case
No. 16, 286.) Likewise the conduct of the family of a person com-
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mitting a crime may be considered on the question.of 'his sanity.
(Wharton and Still6, Med. Jurisp.)
Even though there is a history of insanity in the accused prior to
the homicide, still the burden is on him to prove his insanity at the time
of the murder. And hereditary insanity will not relieve, unless the
accused himself shows insanity. (Guiteau's case, 10 Fed. 161.) The
mere fact that a cause existed which could produce insanity is not suffi-
cient to establish criminal irresponsibility.
RESPONSIBILITY; KNOWLEDGE OF RIGHT AND WRONG
Responsibility is shown where the individual willingly and inten-
tionally, and to graiify a wish of his own, commits a criminal act,
knowing and appreciating the circumstances under which the act was
done. Responsibility depends upon power and intellect, not upon
feeling. The culprit is punished, not just because he knew good from
evil, but because he voluntarily .did the evil, having the power to choose
the good. (Bulknill and Tuk~s, Psychological Medicine, p. 269.) A
medical witness may argue that feeling precedes the act, and that after
feeling comes desire and choice. Law makes the accused responsible
for the choice and not for the feeling. Or, stated in another way, a
man cannot be punished for a morbid desire, but he can be for giving
way to it.
Conversely, to prove irresponsibility, it must be shown that the
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from mental dis-
ease as not to know the nature and quality of the act he vas doing;
or, if he did know it, that he did not know that he was doing wrong.
(Flanagan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467.) This is the legal essence of the
whole matter. The two tests are in the alternative ;- but the ability to
distinguish right from wrong must be wholly destroyed. (Comm'on-
wealth v. Barner, 199. Pa. St. 335.) If the accused knew that the act
was wrong, it has been ruled that mere insane belief that it was justi-
fiable is no excuse. (Comm onwaealth v. Wireback, 190 Pa. St. 138.)
This opinion would depend on the type of the delusion. In Pennsyl-
vania, the test lies in the word "power"-the power to tell right from
wrong, and the power to adhere to the right, and to avoid the wrong.
Justice McLean of the U. S. Supreme Court said that the ability
to discriminate between right and wrong can best be ascertained by the
acts of the individual himself (as showing a sense of guilt, attempts -to
escape punishment, etc.) and not by any medical theory. A slight
departure from a well-balanced mind cannot be recognized as insanity
in the administration of criminal law, even though it might be declared
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insanity in medical science. (Taylor v. Cominonwealth, 109 Pa. 262.)
Some courts have held that the test of criminal responsibility is
the mental ability to discriminate between abstract right and wrong.
(Walker v. People, 88 N. Y. 86; affirming N. Y. Grim. Rep. 7; Moett
v. People, 85 N. Y. 373.) But usually the capacity is regarded as
concrete instead of as abstract, i. e., the wrongfulness of the particular
act. There must be an absence of knowledge either morally or legally
in order to relieve from criminal responsibility. (Willis v. People, 32
N. Y. 715; affirming 5 Park Crim. Rep. 621.)
INTENT
Non-existence of a motive has been held as immaterial. The law
only regards the proximate consequences of the act-the intention. It
is important to determine whether the accused had the capacity to
entertain a criminal intent, and whether he did entertain it. A lack of
foresight, for example, implies lack of intention, and where intention
is part of the crime, such an act is not criminal. First degree murder,
of course, requires a specific intent to kill. Evidence of insanity can
be allowed to show the absence of premeditation; a lesser degree of
murder has been found in such cases.
DOUBT
The evidence must be fairly preponderating, and to the reasonable
satisfaction of the jury. (State v. Brooks, Mont. 57 Pac. R. 1038.) A
probability "of insanity meets the requirements of a preponderance.
Any doubt must be a reasonable one. In New York it has been held
to be insufficient to establish a reasonable doubt of insanity, where the
defendant testified that his mind was a bank just before the murder,
and others also testified that he was nervous and excitable. (People
v. Osmond, 138 N. Y. 80.) So in proving insanity beyond a reason-
able doubt, the doubt must not be a mere imaginary sophism or cap-
tion. (People v. Barberi, 12 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 22; People v. Coleman,
1 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 1.)
It has been ruled that where two inferences may be drawn from
an item of proof, one of sanity and the other of insanity, the presump-
tion requires the inference of sanity to be chosen. (Appeal of Sturde-
vant, 71 Conn. 392; 42 Atl. R. 70.)
As to the continuance or permanency of insanity, this must be
determined from the evidence as to the character of the insanity. The
presumption of a continuance of insanity cannot always be held where
temporary insanity is asserted as a defense. Whether progressive or
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permanent is a question of fact for the jury. Lapse of time alone does
not presume absolute recovery, and a patient should not be discharged
from a hospital merely because of a lucid interval. (People ex rel.
Arorton v. N. Y. Hospital, 3 abb. N. C. 229.)
Where insanity appears at the time of the trial, but was not present
at the time of the act, the court may delay judgment or execution.
For insanity developing after the act does not prevent a subsequent
trial after recovery.
Inasmuch as in this article we are reviewing the subject of crime
and insanity from the legal viewpoint, there would be no practical
benefit in going into each mental disease entity separately. For, as we
stated before, law is interested primarily in the question as to whether
there is irresponsibility or not, and not in the form of insanity, if any
be present.
So, disregarding the various symptom-complexes known to medi-
cine, I will briefly review the most common legal pleas where insanity
or irresponsibility is the issue. These chiefly relate to-
I. Delusional insanity.
I. Impulsive insanity, irresistible impulse, and obsession.
III. Hysteria.
IV. Mania, transitory mania (melancholia).
V. Moral insanity, character anomalies.
VI. Defective will power.
DELUSIONAL INSANITY
Though in medicine delusions are not an essential element to indi-
cate unsoundness of mind, in law they are important. So likewise i$
their absence. The delusion exists because of defective reasoning
power or critique.
Medically, a delusion is a false belief or conception, due to mental
disease, which is not based on facts, but is in conflict with evidence;
and which cannot be corrected by reason. One adds "due to mental
disease," to eliminate faulty beliefs due to unsound education, etc.
Unlike the delusion, which is usually believed with dogmatic certainty
by the individual, the obsessive idea is the object of anxious doubt.
The so-called delusional concepts must not be mere notions or impres-
sions, nor only odd ideas which develop as the result of a depraved
moral state.
Delusions, in law, must be mental-not merely moral; and not
just hastily formed opinions. (52 N. Y. St. R. 914.) In New York
and most states the delusion must deprive the person of the knowledge
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of the nature and quality and wrongfulness of the act. And a delusion
is not a defense if it solely claims mistreatment.
It has been held that the act and the delusion must be connected;
or that the delusion must prevent seeing the wrongfulness of the act.
And it has also been held that the delusion must be such that if it were
a true concept, then under such circumstances the act would be jus-
tifiable.
IMPULSIVE INSANITY; IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE; OBSESSIONS
These pleas, so frequently advanced -by criminals to excuse, are
so similar we will consider them together. These terms are rather
confused in the legal literature. The psychologist, Sully, describes
impulse thus: "Those innate promptings of activity in which there is
no clear representation of a pleasure, and consequently no distinct
desire." Or impulse may be defined as an impelling force, or a sudden
or transient mental feeling. Deliberation implies comparing and
weighing. Where a decision is made without deliberation it is called
impulsive. However, conduct which is very elaborate can hardly be
called impulsive.
Irresistible means offering no resistance, or powerless. An irre-
sistible impulse, legally, has been described as one where there is an
unseen pressure which perceives the results, but which cannot resist
its execution. This is not convertible with a passionate propensity.
Reason operates through love or fear. The will follows the strongest
motive; and, of course, superior motives must be enforced. Griesinger
doubts whether impulses are irresistible even among the insane; at
least he states this cannot be answered with certainty. For even re-
covered maniacs have testified that they could often restrain certain
wild desires. And in partial corroboration of this, one might say, how
rarely we hear of a homicide being committed among the thousands
and tens of thousands of the inmates of our state or private insane
hospitals.
So, ruling out automatic states, an act is not so much a question
of weak will as it is of violent excitation of the emotions. (Wharton
and Stille's Med. Juris., Vol. I, p. 197.) But neither melancholia nor
irresistible, uncontrollable passion is an excuse in itself. (People v.
Montgomery, 13 abb. Pr: N. S. 207, N. Y.)
Physicians nowadays do not recognize any such disease entity as
Impulsive Insanity; and, without a doubt, many of the opinions of the
courts on Impulsive Insanity, so-called, really refer to other forms of
insanity. And all genuine insane impulses do not come under obses-
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sions. In fact, the paradigm from which the latter term c6mes-Ob-
sessional Neurosis-is not regarded as insanity by the best medical
authorities. (Ernest Jones, "Papers on Psychoanalysis," p. 528.) If
this view is accepted, it would not be valuable (alone) to show legal
irresponsibility. As a matter of fact, real obsessional cases being
ethically and not criminally inclined, rarely conflict 'with the law.
Real insane impulses may arise from delusions or hallucinations.
They may occur in Manic Depressive Insanity, Epilepsy, and other
morbid states; and in these cases they are a legitimate defense, and arm
to be judged according to the genera:ly accepted rulings as to criminal
responsibility. It must he remembered that normal minds also have
impulses. But, in any case, where irresistible impulse is pleaded, ex-
amine for insane delusions and other evidences of undoubted insanity.
The complaint of irresistible impulse of a criminal trend is heard
re'atively infrequently in hospital practice, or in physicians' consulta-
tion offices. But it is a very common plea in criminal trials. Courts
have ruled that it is not for the best interests of the community to hold
such peop:.e as irresponsibe. (Witthaus and Beeker, Vol. III, p. 245.)
It might be noted here that "irresistible impulse" is to the accused's
lawyer what "a constitutional psychopathic state" may be for certain
experts-i. e., something to seize when nothing more tangible is evident.
Inasmuch as every crime is committed under an impulse more or
less irresistible, such a doctrine universally applied would be dangerous
for society. For the' object of the law is to control such impulses.
(Regina v. Barton, 3 Cox Cr. Ca. 275.) Three powerful restraints to
irresistib.e impulse are conscience, religion, and law. And Baron
Bramwell said the third restraint mentioned cannot be lightly with-
drawn. (Regina v. Haynes 1 F. and F. 666.) And as Baron Rolfe
in the English poisoning case of Regina v. Alluitt said, "Every crime
was committed under (such) an influence, and the object of the law
was to compel people to control these influences." Baron Parke said
that if the excuse of irresistible impulse, going hand in hand with full
possession of reasoning powers, were allowed as a defense, then it
might be urged in justification in nearly every case. A New York
judge remarked that irresistible impulse, where the individual knew
his legal and moral duty, had no place in law. (Flanagan v. People,
52 N. Y. 467, 11 Am. Rep. 731.) The same thing is expressed in
numerous court opinions. (People v. Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238; U. S.
v. Holmes, 1 Cliff. 98, Fed. No. 15382.)
Many states have adopted the North Carolina rule, that irresistible
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impulse is 'no excuse for crime if the person can distinguish right from
wrong. (People v. Mills, 98 N. Y. 176.)
According to the New York Penal Code, a morbid impulse to
commit a criminal act, where the person knows the act is wrong, is no
defense. (People v. Tavlor, 138 N. Y. 398; People v. Waltz, 50 How.
Pr. 214; Flanagan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467; People v. Casey, 31 Hum.
158; Willis v. People, 32 N. Y. 715.)
Judge Andrews of the Court of Appeals said that courts of law
are against the idea of "sonie mysterious pressure" to commit criminal
*acts. (Court of Appeals, N. Y., Vol. 52, p. 469.) In the Walworth
case, Judge Davis said that if the accused knew the legal and moral
character of the act, the allegation that he had no control of his will-
being controlled by irresistible impulse to commit acts the consequences
of which he anticipates but cannot avoid-is no defense. (People v.
Walworth, N. Y. Crim. Rep., Vol. 4, p. 353; People v. Coleman,
1 N. Y. Cr. R. 1; Willis v. People 32 N. Y. 715.) And Judge Brannon
said, "[ admit the existence of irresistible impulse, but not as consist-
ent with an adequate realization of the wrong of the act."
But where the man was legally sane, but medically insane (as
where he knew the act was wrong, but could not restrain himself) a
lesser degree of murder has been found. (State v. Kolb, 7 Ohio, N. P.
547; case of William Hooper Young, Crim. Br. N. Y. Supr. Ct., Feb.,
1903.) And, as I stated previously, the law also holds that every form
of insanity does not mean legal irresponsibility. (People v. Silverman.
181 N. Y. 235.)
The courts of New York, California, Michigan, and about fifteen
other states have explicitly rejected irresistible impulse as a defense.
Only a few states, eleven, I think, permit the plea of irresistible im-
pulse as a defense for the commission of a moral wrong or a legal
crime. And even in those states the rule is that it must go with an
inability to distinguish, as well as to choose, between right and wrong.
So such a defense could not be sustained even in these states if the
defendant knew the difference between right and wrong and knew
that his act was morally a crime, even though impelled to its commis-
sion by overmastering anger, revenge, or other inordinate passion. It
has been ruled that it must exist to the extent of subjugating the intel-
lect, controlling the will, and rendering it impossible to do otherwise
than yield. (Goodein v. State, 96 Ind. 550.) And an act is punish-
able, though committed by one under an irresistible impulse, where the
mental faculties were otherwise in a sound, normal condition. (Bos-
well v. State, 63 Ala. 307; 35 Am. Rep. 20.) So we see that even its
advocates say that this plea should be used with caution.
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The question whether the accused had a genuine insane impu'se,
and whether he was able to resist it, are questions of fact for the jury
to decide. (Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577; People v. Egnor, 175 N. Y.
419.)
. And it must be admitted that even in those states where they are
not recognized by the decisions and statutes, yet the pleas of 'morbid
impulse" and "loss of will power" often dominate a jury's verdict.
Even though the judge may charge against "impulsive insanity," the
jury has shown its attitude by bringing in a verdict of guilty of a lesser
degree of murder. (People v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 335.)
The legal aspects of irresistible impulse are discussed by Prof.
W. H. Parry in an exhaustive article (63 Albany Law Journal, 429,
-459) ; and also by Justice Brannon, who went into the question very
fully. (State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729.)
OBSESSIONS; OBSESSIONAL (OR COMPULSION) NEUROSIS
Inasmuch as the term obsession is frequently confounded with the
legal plea of "Impulsive Insanity," I thought it would be advisable to
briefly discuss the medico-legal conceptions of obsessions and the Ob-
sessional or Compulsive Neurosis. It will not be my purpose here to
enter into any analytical speculations as to the unconscious motivations
of obsessions, as this would have no legal interest or value.
Obsessions are imperative morbid ideas which have a tendency to
control conduct against the will, and are usually associated with a state
of anxiety. We all know, however, that reactions to genuine obses-
sions can usually be held in check.
The difference between an imperative idea and a fixed idea might
be stated here. An imperative idea is one which comes to. the indi-
vidual against his will, and which idea he recognizes as abnormal, and
not in keeping with his usual ideas, and of which he tries to rid him-
self. Whereas a fixed idea harmonizes with the patient's other ideas,
so that he does not regard it as either foreign or abnormal.
A very important feature about an obsessive act is that it is de-
fensive, and not aggressive. An obsession, unlike' a hallucination, does
not fundamentally involve the senses; and, unlike a delusion, it is
accompanied with anxiety, doubt, and resistance. and there is no
marked concomitant disorder of consciousness or of judgment.
Whereas a delusion is readily expressed, often dogmatically, and is
usually believed and reacted to as being true.
The real obsession arises in consciousness spontaneously and the
compulsion is recognized by the individual as morbid. It is accom-
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panied by annoyance, resistance, and distress. It is quite persistent.
If the compulsion is yielded to, it is done only under protest. The
yielding relieves the accompanying tense feelings, but does not ter-
minate them. This cycle may be repeated indefinitely.
"In these cases the repressed emotion is gotten rid of through
another indifferent, substituted idea, unlike the conversion mechanism
seen in Hysteria. And also, unlike Hysteria, individuals suffering
from an Obsessional Neurosis do not develop an amnesia (forgetful-
ness), but rather they say that the idea is not important. It is well
recognized that the next most efficient thing to denying the existence
of anything is to deny its importance, or to disparage its value.
So an act due to an obsession differs from a normal act and from
a criminal act.
An obsessive act differs from a normal act in that it is against the
individual's inclination; nor does he consciously desire the consequences
of the act. In fact, the object of an insane (pathological) homicidal
impulse is often one near and dear to the individual-maybe his own
child. Such individuals usually seek protection against their morbid
impulses, of which they are in great fear. And these people, though
-encountered not infrequently in private practice, are rarely seen in the
criminal courts, they being not only intelligent, but also very ethical
individuals.
An obsessive act differs entirely from a criminal act. In genuine
obsession there is no deliberation, no intention, nor passion (anger.
jealousy or revenge) acting consciously. Instead there is recognition
that the impulse is morbid, and with this there co-exists an aversion
ind resistance against giving way to it. It might also be noted that
most of the acts are usually harmless, trivial, or even ridiculous. But
in the criminal act the motive is evident, the occasion is propitious, and
the opportunity is sought; i. e., the act is premeditated.
Genuine obsessive impulses are founded in mental conflict, the
causes for which the individual does not know; whereas criminal im-
pulses are usually consciously well motivated. The true obsessional
person rebels against complying with his slavish instincts; which is
quite unlike the criminal, who acts for selfish reasons, and who is not
inhibited or even influenced by any ethical reasons. So we might say
that the act in true obsession is subjective, i. e., due to a state within
the individual; while the criminal act is objective, i. e., the result of
things outside the patient. One must note carefully whether the element
of conscious hatred is present, which it is in criminal impulses, but is
absent in 6bsessional neurotics. One must remember that in Obses-
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sional Neurosis, where the inter-mixture of love and hate causes com-
pulsion and doubt, that love is the conscious element, hate being chiefly
confined to the unconscious. Needless to say, law cannot administer
justice on any consideration of the unconscious mental life. For to
this sphere only few physicians have given much attention. And what
is more, the unconscious of all people-sane and insane-are similar;
it is in their conscious mental lives that they show their differences.
So it is evident why genuine obsession can hardly be logically -asserted
as an excuse for a criminal act.
In Obsessional Neurosis the compulsion is the essential factor. It
may take the form of ceremonials, scruples, fears, obsessional doubts
or compulsive acts. Though of more medical than legal interest, I
might state here that Obsessional Neurosis is- classified under the
neuroses (or so-called functional nervous diseases), and not under the
psychoses (insanities). I might also add that, though I frequently
have to commit mental patients to .hospitals for the insane, I have never
in my twenty years' practice committed a case of Obsessional Neurosis,
for we do not usually regard them as being dangerous, nor requiring
treatment in a hospital for the insane.
HYSTERIA
Hysteria is sometimes confounded in the literature with Obses-
sional Neurosis. Alone, of course, it is not a legal excuse for crime,
though we know that these patients are prone to receive morbid im-
pressions. The term is wrongly used by some writers as being synony-
mous with neurotic, and both terms are erroneously employed for all
sorts of eccentricities.
According to Moebius and other writers, a large part of mankind
at times suffers from hysterical manifestations. So if this plea were
readily a.owed to be sustained, any neurotic individual who openly
committed a crime, say through fear of failure (social, financial, sexual,
personal, etc.) could claim excuse on the grounds of irresponsibility.
The upholding of such a contention would be a disastrous one for
society.
MANIA; TRANSITORY MANIA
Where maniacal excitement is an evidence of Manic Depressive
Insanity, or where it is an episodic experience occurring during the
course of one of the other forms of genuine insanity, the other signs
and symptoms will be present; and there is often a history of repeated
attacks. One must not confound a crime due to emotional stress with
JOHN F. W. MEAGHER
an act resulting from a diseased mental process. The criminal act
shows full intention, choice, and malice, and is deliberate; and the emo-
tional tension is relieved by the act. But the act of the real manic
patient is spontaneous, and the excitement keeps on even after the
act--maybe for days and weeks. The genuine victim of mania or
melancholia rarely appears in the criminal courts, as his condition is so
evident, he is promptly placed under treatment.
The term "Impulsive Insanity" is unscientific, and should never
be used where Mania is inferred. All authorities agree that "Mania"
and "Transitory Mania" are much overused terms in medical juris-
prudence. It has been ruled in law that for Mania to excuse, the
accused must be unconscious of the wrongfulness of his act. So the
legal plea of "Transitory Mania" (and its medical analogue, a hypb-
manic state) usually meets with little favorable consideration on the
part of the courts. (People v. Osmond, 138 N. Y. 80; People v. Casey,
2 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 187.)
It is not unknown in medico-legal literature for a jury to accept
a plea of "Transitory Mania" where the evidence did not warrant
it. This has been sort of a subterfuge verdict in a certain class of
cases, e. g., where the jury, reflecting public opinion, felt that the vic-
tim deserved his fate. Needless to say, however, medical science can-
not assume any such attitude.
MORAL INSANITY; ECCENTRICITIES OF CHARACTER
There is no one disease where there exists only a deficiency in the
moral sphere. We do see it secondarily in Mental Defectives (feeble-
mindedness), Senile Dementia, etc. But in these conditions we get the
other corroborative signs of the primary disease. In this article we
are not discussing Mental Defectives, who are not included in the in-
sane category, and who, unlike the insane, were never normal. How-
ever, we might add that even with them, if they commit crimes, law is
interested only in their responsibility or irresponsibility, and not espe-
cally in the clinical features of their mental defects.
Mere moral obliquity or perversion of the affections will not pro-
tect an accused person. A defective moral tone is shown not by one
act alone, but by the whole life history of the individual. If, because
of habitual vice, conscience no longer controls the individual, this is no
defense. The same legal criteria are applied in judging these cases as
in all cases. (People v. Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 250; Willis v. People,
32 N. Y. 717.)
CRIME AND INSANITY 59
Bad temper and an excitable disposition, and eccentricities of
character, where the accused knew that his act was unlawful and
morally wrong, is not an excuse for crime. (Sindram v. People, 1
N. Y. Crim. Rep. 448, affirming 88 N. Y. 196; Willis v. People, 32
N. Y. 717, affirming 5 Park Cr. 621.) It was held in Illinois that it
was insufficient to prove insanity merely to show that the accused was
queer, nervous and excitable, and felt that he was going crazy. (Witt-
haus and Becker, "Medical Jurisprudence," Vol. III, p. 563.)
Loss OF WILL POWER
The criminal offends the law not because desire is stronger, but
because the restraining influence of morality is weaker. An impulsive
and less elaborate act indicates a lessened degree of responsibility.
Desire is the basis of will; and desire depends on a state of feel-
ing, indicating a want or a need. It is the dynamic force behind the
motive, which precedes the act. For the good of society, self-control
must be exercised. Self-control is the power to forego immediate
pleasure for greater benefits and is more a question of will than of
reasoning. -Usually where there is a weak will, there is a weak intel-
lect and poor power of connected thought, a weak moral tone, and
indolence, with reactions to slight or inefficient motives. It is almost
unnecessary to add that choice implies deliberation and judgment. Ala-
bama adds to the requirement to distinguish between right and wrong,
the test to choose between right and wrong. While Indiana permits
the plea to be advanced that the accused suffered from weakness of will
and was too weak to resist the impulse, Justice Davis in the New
York General Term was very emphatic in denying the importance of
this in criminal cases. And the Court of Appeals confirmed the con-
viction in the case in which he so ruled. (88 N. Y. 81.)
SIMULATION
It is contrary to the ideas of modern Psychiatry to claim that a
person should be sane just before and after a crime, and insane just
at the time of its commission. And law feels that a counterfeit of
insanity is often resorted to when other means of escaping punishment
for a crime are absent. (People v. Larrabee, 115 Cal. 158.) It is also
claimed in medical jurisprudence that a plea of insanity may be ad-
vanced with the hope of deceiving a lay jury.
The pleas of "irresistible impulse" and "emotional insanity" are
often founded on nothing but marked emotional outbursts, without the
presentation of any evidence of genuine insanity. If all such asser-
60 JOHN F. W. MEAGHER
tions were accepted, any rich homicidal criminal could by such means
raise a reasonable doubt and escape punishment for his act. And. as 1
stated previously, sane people also have sudden impulses, but they hold
them in check. As a matter of fact, the usual plea of "irresistible
impulse" is in no way related to genuine obsessions or to imperative
conceptions, as seen in certain neuroses. But it is frequently used as a
shield to infer legal. irresponsibility.
LAW AND THE EXPERT WITNESS
Opinions may be based on both a personal examination of the
accused and on the evidence heard. (Re Shellinqj, 11 Ohio, S. and
C. P. Dec. 81.) An expert can give an opinion as to sanity, but not as
to responsibility, which is a question of law.
Observations of a prisoner by an expert are not regarded as con-
fessions. An expert may testify as to the prisoner's conduct, even
though the prisoner was not warned. (Burt v. State, Tex. Cr. App.,
40 S. W. Rep. 1000.)
The testimony of a medical witness who has examined the accused
cannot be objected to, on the ground that the accused was thereby
compelled to furnish evidence against himself. (People v. Kenwmler,
119 N. Y. 580, 24 N. T. 9; People v. Truck, 170 N. Y. 203, 63 N. E.
281.) This applies to expert witnesses for the prosecution. Nor can
the fact that the accused was in jail, unwarned, be entered as an objec-
tion to the admission of testimony. (People v. Youngs, 151 N. Y. 210,
45 N. E. 400.)
Numerous reasons are given by different writers as to why alien-
ists disagree so radically in the same case. Undoubtedly a difference
in their individual attitude toward law's standard in criminal cases has
much to do with their conflicting testimony. In criminal cases the
expert's appearance in court is to be viewed more as a courtesy of the
law than as a prerogative. Some experts disregard entirely the stand-
ard that law lays down in these cases, which is that insanity is equiva-
lent to, or identical with, irresponsibility.
Law is not interested in mental diseases as clinical problems. She
does not specially concern herself with the varioas forms of insanity,
such as Dementia Precox, Senile Dementia, etc. Rather. she specifies
what mental tests are to be applied to prove irresponsibility. i. e., legal
insanity. The fact of irresponsibility is for the jury to decide. An
expert may search diligently for incipient signs of insanity. If he finds
any, he may then try to show by induction or deduction that the
accused is suffering from such a mental disorder that would excuse
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him for his crime. And yet, legally, his opinion might be quite un-
warranted. It is hardly necessary to say that it is only in the border-
line cases that controversy arises. For law and medicine agree on the
straightforward cases of insanity.
It ill behooves an expert to scoff at law's criteria to show irre-
sponsibility. For in the first place, those who have framed and those
who are now administering our laws have some claim to intelligence.
And in the second place, law could justly ridicule the opinions of some
experts, who on occasion do not hesitate to say that a few eccentric
traits, such as sullenness, irritability, etc., means "insanity"; or of other
cxperts, who, arguing from the general to the particular, find an indi-
vidual insane because he shows a few flaws in his makeup. There is
a difference between being perfect and being sane, even though sane
means sound. The average man is not a perfect man. For if perfec-
tion (mental and physical) were the only standard, how many normal
people could qualify? But, of course, all of mankind cannot be placed
in only one of two categories-sane or insane. These are extreme
states; there are all sorts of gradations between the two. I
The contrasting attitudes of two alienists in a criminal action
where the question of insanity was the issue might be compared to the
following situation. The question is asked, "Is this house habitable?"
Two real estate experts examine the house carefully. One swears it is
habitable. The other expert, having ideas of his own, disregards the
ordinary meaning of habitable and insists that habitable also means
absolute perfection, more or less. Finding some minor defects, he then
feels justified in swearing the building is not habitable. One expert
must be wrong if the other is right.
So, again, I would reiterate that an expert's attitude-more than
any other single element-may be the chief factor back of his opinion.
And the present disagreement of alienists in the courts will keep up
until they are individual'y asked whether they are keeping in mind the
legal criteria when giving their answers, or whether they are guided
only by their own attitudes and personal ideas. Needless to say, the
alienist whose function. it is to aid the court should never take a parti-
san attitude in any case.
I wish to gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to the various
authors and writers in this field whose works I have consulted and
quoted, more especially Wharton and Still6, Hamilton and Godkin, and
Witthaus and Becker for their splendid treatises on Medical Juris-
prudence, and also the writings of Fenning and Mercier.
